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Abstract In this paper, we propose a novel technique that
uses fingerprint features with coordinates (x, y), angle and
type of feature as watermark information for authentication in
H.264/AVC video. We utilize some techniques such as Gabor
algorithm, locally adaptive thresholding, and Hilditch’s thin-
ning together with heuristic rules and Hamming measure-
ment to optimally extract minutiae vector (x, y, angle, type)
from fingerprint as well as to improve accuracy of match-
ing process. Furthermore, to make our scheme robust, the
minutiae vector will be converted to binary stream which
is increased three times and the lowest frequency of DCT
blocks of transition images or frames in H.264 video is prop-
erly chosen to hold them. With our proposed technique, the
authentication scheme can achieve high capacity and good
quality. Experimental results show that our proposed tech-
nique is robust against to H.264 encoder, time stretching in
video, Gaussian noise, adding blur, frame removal in video,
and cutting some regions in the frame of video.
Keywords Video watermarking · H.264/AVC video ·
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1 Introduction
The digital world has invaded many aspects of our lives and
moved to all households rapidly in the past decade. More
and more digital data are available through various chan-
nels such as Internet and media discs. One of the reasons
behind the rise of digital data is that users can easily and
quickly make a perfect copy of movie, music, or image at
large scale with low cost and high quality. Consequently,
this has raised concerns about copyright protection against
unauthorized duplications and other illegal activities when
both content providers and owners realized that the tradi-
tional protection methods are no longer efficient and suf-
ficient security [1]. For instance, encryption will not work
anymore after decryption since consumers can freely manip-
ulate the decrypted digital content. Other protection methods
based on specific header can also easily be broken by remov-
ing the header or converting file format. As a result, digital
watermarking, the art of hiding copyright information in the
robust and invisible manner, has been investigated widely as
a perfect complementary technology for copyright protec-
tion. With this approach, the embedded data portion consid-
ered as evidence to prove copyright of host signal is named
watermark. Whereas, the unmarked data portion that needs
protected is called host object or unwatermarked object. The
marked or watermarked object will be generated after embed-
ding watermark in host object. The relationship among three
objects can be demonstrated in Fig. 1a.
Capacity, invisibility and robustness are the most impor-
tant criteria in a digital watermarking system. Capacity is
the amount of information (the number of bits) which can
be embedded in one unit of the host object (e.g. sample,
pixel, scene and so on). Invisibility regards to the similarity
between unmarked and marked objects. It is usually evalu-
ated by peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR). The higher PSRN
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Fig. 1 a Digital watermarking system; b overview of different types of video watermarking approaches
value gives better invisibility. Finally, robustness is consid-
ered as the ability of extracting the hidden data from the
watermarked signal as well as the survival of the watermark
after manipulations or attacks. Because of various operations
on digital signal, no watermarking scheme is robust perfectly.
As usual, each approach can be robust against to some given
and limited alterations. Even though there have been many
studies with different approaches, none of the watermarking
schemes is strongly enough to meet all requirements at the
same time.
The embedded data is usually used to identify the orig-
inal or copyright information about authors, legal owners,
company logo, or signature [2,3]. Recently, biometric infor-
mation such as iris, face and fingerprint have been utilized
and employed as useful watermark [4,5] because it is unique,
invariant, and cannot be changed even if stolen. In this paper,
we make use important features of fingerprint consisting of
the coordinates (x, y), angle and type of features (1 for bifur-
cation, 0 for ridge ending), namely major minutiae features,
as a watermark to authenticate protected content. Hence,
there will be about from 30 to 100 minutiae instead of whole
fingerprint image embedded in host video [6]. In addition to
high reliability of fingerprint, our approach meet the above-
mentioned three prerequisites of watermarking problems.
Furthermore, there have been many methods and surveys
on digital watermarking [7,8]; however, none of them focuses
on video watermarking. Because video protection is not a
simple extension of still image protection, more challenges
have been encountered. Video watermarking approaches can
be classified in Fig. 1b.
Uncompressed video watermarking methods: Most of exist-
ing video watermarking methods focus on raw video because
of reusability and inheritability from existing image and
audio methods. Raw video is simply considered as a sequence
of consecutive and equally time-spaced still images. In
raw video watermarking algorithm, the inserted code can
be casted directly into the video sequence and embedding
process can be performed either in the spatial/temporal
domain or transformed domain (e.g. DCT, DFT and SVD).
Working with uncompressed video allows us to achieve the
video-coding format independence and inherit the robustness
of image and audio watermarking.
According to how a video is treated, there are two
main sub-categories, namely, image-independent and image-
adaptive. The first one considers a video as a set of indepen-
dent still images, so any image watermarking method can be
extended to video. Whereas, image-adaptive approaches are
based on the video content, therefore, they can exploit more
information from the host signal. Different from the first sub-
category, content-based watermarking schemes have utilized
the concept of Human Visual System (HVS) to adapt more
efficiently to the local characteristics of the host signal. These
schemes exploit more properties of the image so that they
can maximize the watermark robustness while satisfying the
transparency requirement.
Compressed video watermarking methods: A video is usually
stored in a compression format, such as MPEG-2, MPEG-4
or H.264 to save in the storage space. Probably, raw video
is not common because of its large size. Therefore, studies
on video watermarking schemes focus on compressed video.
The results have shown that inserting watermark into a com-
pressed video allows real-time processing due to low com-
putational complexity. However, it faces problems of video
compression standard and payload.
So far, there have been three main approaches dealing
with the compressed video watermarking problems shown
in Fig. 1b. The first approach embeds watermark into raw
video before compressing video such as the H.264/AVC
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video watermarking method of Proföck et al. [9] against
lossy compression, the strong block selection method against
lossy compression standards (e.g. H.264, XviD) of Polyák
and Fehér [10] and the new watermarking method based
on video 1-D DFT transform and Radon transform of Liu
and Zhao [11]. The second approach is to embed water-
mark directly into the compressed bit stream by changing
some parts such as replacing the value of some bytes in
the compressed H.264/AVC bitstream [12] and replacing the
bits in different blocks based on metadata generated during
the pre-analysis [13] in the H.246/AVC compression stan-
dard. The third approach allows inserting embedded data
into the host compressed video during the encoding such
as the watermarking method based on the characteristics of
the H.264 standard of Noorkami and Mersereau [14], the
hybrid watermark method on the H.264 compression stan-
dard used for authentication and copyright protection Qiu et
al. [15], the robust watermark method based on H.264/AVC
video compression standard of Zhang et al. [16], the water-
marking method for the authentication problem on the H.264
video of Su and Chen [7] and the robustness watermarking
algorithm on Audio Video Coding Standard (AVS) video of
Wanga et al. [17].
Hybrid watermarking methods: Pik-Wah [18] proposed a
hybrid approach to improve the performance and robust-
ness of the watermarking scheme. The scene-based water-
marking scheme can be improved with two types of hybrid
approaches: visual-audio hybrid watermarking and hybrid
with different watermarking schemes. The visual-audio
hybrid watermarking scheme applies the same watermark
into both frames and audio. This approach takes the advan-
tage of watermarking the audio channel, because it provides
an independent means for embedding the error-correcting
codes, which carry extra information for watermark extrac-
tion. Therefore, the scheme is more robust than other schemes
which only use video channel alone. The hybrid approach
with different watermarking schemes can further be divided
into two classes: independent scheme and dependent scheme.
Even though there are many studies with different
approaches, none of watermarking schemes is strongly
enough capacity, invisibility and robustness at the same time.
For instance, the method of Pröfrock et al. [9] against lossy
compression H.264/AVC, robustness with regular video
attacks and good video quality but not high capacity; the
method of Polyák and Fehér [10] gives good results, lower
complexity, faster execution, against H.264/AVC and XviD
lossy compression process but not robustness with regular
video attacks; the method of Liu and Zhao [11] only shows
stable to H.264 compression standard, variable geometry and
other attacks; and the method of Zou and Bloom [13] is done
very quickly at low cost, good compression video quality but
not robustness. However, our proposed scheme can achieve
high capacity, good quality and robustness. That means our
approach can solve three prerequisites of watermarking prob-
lems.
The paper is organized as follows: after the Introduction
section, all related techniques imployed in this paper will be
given in the Sect. 2. The proposed scheme will be demon-
strated in Sect. 3. Section 4 will show experimental results
and discussion. In final, conclusion as well as future research
will be given in Sect. 5.
2 Related works
2.1 Pre-processing fingerprint image
The flowchart of pre-processing fingerprint image can be
demonstrated in Fig. 2 with input is a fingerprint image and
output is a high quality thinned fingerprint image.
Step 1: filtering
This step will give the high quality of fingerprint image. That
means, it makes image clearer, improves the contrast between
ridges and valleys, and connects the ridge breaks. There are
many methods to enhance the quality of images from simple
to complex, from space to frequency domain. However, the
implementation of filters over entire image will not be effec-
tive. Instead, the filter will be applied on individual block
with specific parameters will be more useful [19]. There are
four popular context filters, namely, Gabor, Anisotropic, Wat-
son, and STFT, whose parameters depend on the ridge direc-
tion and the ridge frequency. Corresponding to fingerprint
image and based on experiments, Gabor filter is chosen in
this scheme. It is a linear filter and described as follows:












cos(2π f xθ ),
where θ is the orientation of the derived Gabor filter, f is
the period of the sinusoidal plane wave, σx and σy which are
standard deviations of the Gaussian envelope along x-axis
and y-axis, respectively, and are definite as:













Fig. 2 Flowchart of pre-processing fingerprint
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Fig. 4 Ridge ending and
bifurcation
xθ = x cos θ + y sin θ, yθ = −x sin θ + y cos θ,
σx = kx F(i, j), σy = ky F(i, j),
To be enhanced by employing Gabor filter, the original finger-
print image is first normalized and then extracts orientation
and frequency information for the filtering. The filtering is
performed in the spatial domain with a mask (usually sized
17 × 17). The whole process of enhancing fingerprint image
through Gabor filter is described in Fig. 3.
Step 2: locally adaptive thresholding
This step transforms the 8-bit gray scale fingerprint image to
1-bit image with 0-value for ridges (black) and 1-value for
valleys (white). It is also called image binarization. The sim-
plest way to get the binary image is based on global threshold
T :
I ′(x, y) =
{
1 I (i, j) > T
0 I (i, j) ≤ T .
However, this approach is not good in case of fingerprint
image. Here, we use local threshold instead. That means
the image is first divided into blocks. Within each block, a
grayscale pixel will be transformed white if its value is larger
than the mean intensity value of the current block.
Step 3: fingerprint ridge thinning
This step will eliminate the redundant pixels of ridges
till these ridges are just one pixel wide. Amongst many
thinning algorithms such as Holt and Stewart [20], Sten-
tiford [21], Zhang–Suen [22], the experimental results show
that Hilditch algorithm [23] is simple algorithm and gives
better answer with the fingerprint image. The selected algo-
rithm is described as following:
At point P1 on the ridge, consider the 8-neighbors of pixel
P1.Then, calculate A(P1) and B(P1) where A(P1) is the num-
ber of pairs (0, 1) in the sequence P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8,
P9, P2 and B(P1) is the number of neighbor pixels whose val-
ues are not zero. Pixel P1 will be transformed from 1 (black)
to 0 (white) if it satisfies the following four conditions:
(1) 2 ≤ B(P1) ≤ 6; (2) A(P1) = 1; (3) P2.P4.P8 = 0 or
A(P2) != 1; (4) P2.P4.P6 = 0 or A(P4) != 1.
2.2 Extracting minutiae feature
There are two types of minutiae: ridge ending and ridge bifur-
cation are used for extracting and matching shown in Fig. 4.
Note that a ridge ending is the point at which a ridge termi-
nates, and a bifurcation is the point at which a single ridge
splits into two ridges.
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Fig. 6 Cases if P1 is bifurcation
m1 m2 m3
m4 m5 m6 m7
Fig. 7 False minutia structures
By dividing the image into overlapping blocks, sized 3 ×
3, central point P1 is considered as ridge ending if it is the
following cases (Fig. 5):
Point P1 is bifurcation if it is the following cases (Fig. 6):
The problems of ridge breaks due to lack of or over-ink
or over-press will reduce the accuracy of minutiae extrac-
tion. There are 7 cases causing such problem considered as
following (Fig. 7):
To remove false minutiae, we use heuristic rules as fol-
lows:
If the distance between one bifurcation and one termina-
tion is less than T (T = 7 by default) and the two minutiae are
in the same ridge (m1 case). Remove both of them.
If the distance between two bifurcations is less than T and
they are in the same ridge, remove the two bifurcations (m2,
m3 cases).
If the distance between two ridge endings is less than T and
their directions are coincident within a small angle variation.
And they meet the condition that no termination is located
between the two ridge endings. Then the two terminations
are considered as false minutiae derived from a broken ridge
and are removed (m4, m5, m6 cases).
If two terminations are located in a short ridge with length
less than T, remove the two ridge endings (m7 case).
Where T is the average inter-ridge width representing the
average distance between two parallel neighboring ridges.
The following picture illustrates the minutiae extraction
process (Fig. 8):
Notably, in the above figure, the red circles correspond to
bifurcations (type = 1) and the blue circles correspond to the
ridge endings (type = 0).
3 Proposed method
From all the research and general knowledge, this paper pro-
poses a robust authentication in H.264 video based on the
minutiae (x, y, angle, type) of fingerprint as follows (Fig. 9):
Our authentication scheme using fingerprint watermark
consists of three phases as follows:
3.1 Embedding phase
The flowchart of embedding phase can be demonstrated in
Fig. 10a.
First, the H.264 video is decoded into raw frames by
the H.264 Decoder. Since the transition frames will loose
the least data in the H.264 video encoding phase, they are
selected from the raw frames. With each transition frame, it
is divided into the 8 × 8 non-overlapping blocks. Discrete
Cosine Transformation (DCT) will be applied to the set of
blocks . In addition, the minutiae vector (x, y, angle, type)
generated from fingerprint image after the pre-processing
and extracting minutiae will be converted to binary stream
(called S). Since binary sequence is much smaller than
the transition frame size, we can increase S three times
up to SSS. For instance, with minutiae vector (10, 12,
45, 1), we have S = 0000101000001100001011011 (with
10 = 00001010, 12 = 00001100, 45 = 00101101, 1 =
1) and SSS = 0000101000001100001011011000010100000
11000010110110000101000001100001011011. With the
binary sequence SSS, we can embed one bit (Sk) of sequence
S into one 8 × 8 block Bk by the following steps [24]:
Step 1: Choose two lowest frequencies from each block
called B1k and B2k . Select one parameter a such that
123
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Fig. 10 a Flowchart of embedding phase; b flowchart of extracting phase
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Table 1 The PSNR values of
watermarked video
Authenticated Video 









Size of minutia vector 
increase 3 times (bit) 
PSNR 
(dB) 
1.tif 64.2KB 1152 56.71262 3456 52.02355 
1.jpg 13.9KB 1400 55.83754 4200 51.23702 
2.jpg 9.41KB 1408 55.95424 4224 49.98475 
2.tif 64.5KB 1120 56.68477 3360 50.88121 
3.jpg 12.3KB 2208 54.37198 6624 51.31206 
3.tif 64.5KB 960 57.42595 2880 51.51483 
4.jpg 12.2KB 1856 54.77017 5568 51.68784 
4.tif 64.5KB 1312 56.07391 3936 50.09165 
6.tif 142KB 846 57.41139 2592 51.50177 
10.tif 142KB 416 60.7918 1248 56.60345 
Authenticated Video 









Size of minutia vector 
increase 3 times (bit) 
PSNR 
(dB) 
1.tif 64.2KB 1152 49.66988 3456 44.9808 
1.jpg 13.9KB 1400 48.71718 4200 44.1167 
2.jpg 9.41KB 1408 50.29945 4224 44.33 
2.tif 64.5KB 1120 49.91917 3360 44.1156 
3.jpg 12.3KB 2208 45.10393 6624 42.044
3.tif 64.5KB 960 51.66206 2880 45.7509
4.jpg 12.2KB 1856 45.84466 5568 42.7623
4.tif 64.5KB 1312 50.62513 3936 44.6429
6.tif 142KB 846 52.09545 2592 46.1858
10.tif 142KB 416 54.59979 1248 50.4114
a = 2(2t + 1) with t is a positive integer (0 ≤ t ≤ 127)
(t = 4, a = 18 by default).
Step 2: Calculate distance between the two frequencies,
d = |B1k − B2k | (mod a).
Step 3: Binary bit Sk will be embedded into frequencies
B1k and B2k according to the following rules:
• If Sk = ‘1’ and d ≥ 2t+1, we do not change anything.
If Sk = ‘1’ and d < 2t + 1, either B1k or B2k will be
changed such that max(B1k, B2k) = max(B1k, B2k) +
I N T (0.75 × a) – d.
• If Sk = ‘0’ and d < 2t + 1, we do not change anything.
If Sk = ‘0’ and d ≥ 2t + 1, either B1k or B2k will be
changed such that max(B1k, B2k) = max(B1k, B2k)+
I N T (0.25 × a) − −d.
The three above steps will be repeated until the minutiae
vector SSS is completely embedded in transition frames. To
obtain the stego frames (the watermarked signal), Inverse
Discrete Cosine Transformation (IDCT) will be applied to
each block before combining all together. Afterwards the
H.264/AVC encoder will be applied to the synthesized frames
to obtain stego H.264/AVC video.
3.2 Extracting phase
The watermarked H.264 video may be attacked when it
is transferred on a public channel. Therefore, the received
H.264 video must be decoded into the raw frames by H.264
decoder. Similar to the embedding phase, the transition
frames are selected from the raw frames then are divided
into the 8×8 non-overlapping blocks. Discrete Cosine Trans-
formation (DCT) will be applied to the set of blocks before
extracting the minutiae vector. According to our approach,
each minutia will be taken out based on selecting two
lowest frequencies called B1k and B2k from each block.
Then, based on the distance d = |B1k − B2k | (mod a),
minutia will be conducted as follows: If d ≥ 2t+1 then
Sk = 1 and if d < 2t + 1 then Sk = 0. After
extracting, we get the binary sequence SSS. To obtain the
minutiae vector, we decrease SSS three times down to S.
The whole flowchart of this phase can be described in
Fig. 10b.
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Error D 1 - D Authentication
1.tif 64.2 1152 1152 435 0.377604 0.622396 True
1.jpg 13.9 1400 1400 558 0.396307 0.603693 False
2.jpg 8.89 1408 1408 540 0.383523 0.616477 True
2.tif 64.5 1120 1120 439 0.391964 0.608036 False
3.jpg 12.3 2208 2208 849 0.384511 0.615489 False
3.tif 64.5 960 960 391 0.407292 0.592708 False
4.jpg 12.2 1856 1856 689 0.371228 0.628772 True
4.tif 64.5 1312 1312 489 0.372713 0.627287 True
5.jpg 11.7 1984 1984 377 0.368164 0.631836 True
5.tif 64.5 1024 1024 734 0.36996 0.63004 True
6.jpg 13.6 1664 1664 601 0.361178 0.638822 True
6.tif 142 864 864 315 0.364583 0.635417 True
7.jpg 8.51 1408 1408 535 0.379972 0.620028 True
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Table 2 continued
7.tif 64.5 1696 1696 635 0.37441 0.62559 True
8.jpg 11 2304 2304 908 0.394097 0.605903 False
8.tif 142 416 416 158 0.379808 0.620192 True
9.jpg 13.6 1984 1984 750 0.378024 0.621976 True
9.tif 142 512 512 199 0.388672 0.611328 False
10.jpg 9.41 1696 1696 628 0.370283 0.629717 True
10.tif 142 416 416 137 0.329327 0.670673 True
11.jpg 16.6 1504 1504 551 0.366356 0.633644 True
11.tif 64.5 992 992 377 0.38004 0.61996 True
3.3 Matching phase
This phase is to authenticate the legal of host H.264 video
by matching the extracted minutiae vector with fingerprint
database. Since minutiae vector is considered as a binary
stream, Hamming distance is used to achieve good accuracy
in authentication. The Hamming distance between two vec-




|ai − bi |.
If D is less than a preset threshold D0(D0 = 0.5 by
default) then 2 bit strings are matching. If there are several
matching vectors, the smallest value of D is selected.
4 Results and discussion
Experiments were conducted on a PC with Intel(R) Core
(TM)2 Duo CPU T5800 2.00GHz, RAM 4GB. The operat-
ing system is Windows 7 32-bit and our algorithms were pro-
grammed in Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 and Microsoft Visual
Studio 2008 with supporting of OpenCV and MediaNet Suite
library. To illustrate our scheme, we used the fingerprint
database consisting 1500 samples which were provided by
Ministry of Public Security of Vietnam (Ho Chi Minh city
branch). To demonstrate authentication ability, we used 11
fingerprint images each of which was saved in TIFF and
JPEG formats. Details of these 22 files are listed in Table 1
below. The H.264 videos chosen in experiments are kid.mp4
and woman.mp4 sized 2 MB, 6 MB, respectively.
In our experiments, the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR)
is used to evaluate the quality of the watermarked frame. A
higher PSNR means that the quality of the marked frame is
better. The PSNR is defined as PSNR = 10 × log10 255
2
MSE
(dB), where MSE is the mean square error between the orig-
inal frame and the watermarked one. For a host frame with







(Gxy − G ′xy)2 (1)
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Error D 1 - D Authentication
1.tif 64.2 1152 1152 311 0.269965 0.730035 True
1.jpg 13.9 1400 1400 407 0.289063 0.710937 True
2.jpg 8.89 1408 1408 389 0.276278 0.723722 True
2.tif 64.5 1120 1120 319 0.284821 0.715179 True
3.jpg 12.3 2208 2208 612 0.277174 0.722826 True
3.tif 64.5 960 960 288 0.3 0.7 True
4.jpg 12.2 1856 1856 490 0.264009 0.735991 True
4.tif 64.5 1312 1312 348 0.265244 0.734756 True
5.jpg 11.7 1984 1984 267 0.260742 0.739258 True
5.tif 64.5 1024 1024 521 0.262601 0.737399 True
6.jpg 13.6 1664 1664 422 0.253606 0.746394 True
where Gxy and G
′
xy are the pixel values at position (x, y) of
the host frame and the watermarked frame, respectively.
Our proposed scheme obtains good invisibility. Table 1
displays the quality of different videos which are embedded
and evaluated by PSNR values.
A frame with w × h size can be embedded up to (w ×
h)/(8 × 8) bits (each bit is embedded in to a 8 × 8 block) in
the proposed method. If the number of bits to be embedded
is bigger than the number of 8 × 8 blocks, we cannot embed
each bit into each block. Instead, we will embed more than
123
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Table 3 continued
6.tif 142 864 864 222 0.256944 0.743056 True
7.jpg 8.51 1408 1408 384 0.272727 0.727273 True
7.tif 64.5 1696 1696 453 0.267099 0.732901 True
8.jpg 11 2304 2304 660 0.286458 0.713542 True
8.tif 142 416 416 114 0.274038 0.725962 True
9.jpg 13.6 1984 1984 537 0.270665 0.729335 True
9.tif 142 512 512 144 0.28125 0.71875 True
10.jpg 9.41 1696 1696 446 0.262972 0.737028 True
10.tif 142 416 416 93 0.223558 0.776442 True
11.jpg 16.6 1504 1504 389 0.258644 0.741356 True
11.tif 64.5 992 992 270 0.272177 0.727823 True
one bit into the lowest coefficients of each block. For instance,
after increasing three times, the minutiae of 3.jpg fingerprint
image has 6,624 bits and the kid.mp4 video frame size is 800
× 480. So, we can embed up to (800 × 480)/(8 × 8) = 6,000
bits. In this case, we cannot embed each bit of the minutiae
in to each 8 × 8 block. Therefore, we will embed two bits in
the four lowest coefficients of each 8 × 8 block.
The PSNR in Table 1 is high (≥40 dB). Compared with
the results of the PSNR in [11,14,25], the proposed water-
marking method is high capacity.
Authentication was considered in the following cases:
Case 1: There is no attack over public channels. That
means the images at both receiver and sender are the
same.
Case 2: There are some attacks over public channels. In
our scheme, we consider time stretching in video, Gaussian
noise, adding blur, frame removal in video, cutting some
regions in the frame of video, and converting H.264 video
into another video format.
In the first case, the authentication results are recorded in
Tables 2 and 3 with the protected video is kid.mp4.
After embedding the minutiae bits into the selected
frames, these frames were attacked in the process of
H.264/AVC compression such as image subtraction, image
convolution, DCT transform, quantization, reconstruction
and lossy entropy encoding. With a series of attacks, the
experimental results in Tables 2 and 3 are relatively opti-
mistic. Also through the Tables 2 and 3, the selection of
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Table 4 Authentication with attack: stretching time, removing frame, Gaussian noise, adding blur, filtering median, cropping image in frame,
converting into another video format
Fingerprint Image: 1.tif
The embedded minutiae size : 1152 bits
The extracted minutiae size: 1152 bits
Attacks Attacked Video D 1 - D Auth Attacks
Attacked 


























































transition frames is better than the randomly selected frame.
The transition frames are proceeded in the Intra prediction,
the most content of the transition frame is retained and added
in the picture reference list 0 and 1. The Inter prediction uses
the picture reference list 0 and 1. Moreover, most of the video
frames in the H.264 compression having high homology are
in the Inter prediction.
In the second case, we considered some attacks includ-
ing time stretching in video, Gaussian noise, adding blur,
frame removal in video, cutting some regions in the frame
of video, and converting H.264 video into another video for-
mat. The experimental results are presented in Table 4. The
protected video in this case is kid.mp4 and the fingerprint
image is 1.tif. The experimental results show that vector
extracted has the same size with the one embedded. Based
on Hamming values D between the extracted minutiae and
the matched sample, the matched sample is always found
when threshold D0 is set to 0.5. However those D values are
ranged from 0.25 to 0.43, the authentication is still false in
some cases. Moreover, from the results, we can see that our
scheme is more robust to attacks. If attack occurs, two minu-
tiae vectors are almost different; therefore, based on values
of Hamming distance D, we can recognize if there was an
attack.
123
Vietnam J Comput Sci (2014) 1:193–206 205
Fig. 11 Extracting results in the paper [11]
Also through Table 4, we see that the authentication model
is not affected by stretching time in video. Because this
process only affects the time of frame displayed in the screen
without changing the frame data, the removing process only
affects the authentication model if and only if the transition
frames are removed. Depending on the number of removed
transition frames, the authentication result will be affected.
For instances, there are three transition frames in kid.mp4
video. If we remove 10 % or 25 % frames of the video, it
means one transition frame is removed. If we remove 50,
75 or 90 % frames of the video, it means two transition
frames are removed. We have also found that the authen-
tication model is robust with other attacks such as Gaussian
noise, adding blur, filtering median, cropping image in the
frame and not robust with the video format conversion.
Comparing with the experimental results in the papers [14]
and [11], our results are also better (Fig. 11; Table 5).
5 Conclusion
In this article, we have proposed a video authentica-
tion scheme using fingerprint watermark. The experimen-
tal results show that our method has not only achieved high
capacity together with good quality of watermarked video
but also been robust against stretching time, removing frame,







Carphone 44 58 0.80
Claire 22 83 0.44
Mobile 85 85 0.23
Mother 42 68 0.69
Table 38 62 0.31
Tempete 81 83 0.44
Gaussian noise, adding blur, filtering median, and cropping
image in the frame attacks. The PSNR values are bigger than
40 dB in most cases. Otherwise, our scheme just embed about
30–100 minutiae, the proposed method is able to provide very
high capacity. In the future, we will apply this authentication
scheme in other common video standards such as MPEG-2,
MPEG-4 and research another measure to replace Hamming
distance for improving the accuracy of matching process.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the
source are credited.
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